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On David Hume  
Tomasz B. Stanek
After reviewing the (2012) Oxford 
University Press title: Classic and 
contemporary readings in the philosophy of 
education by Steven M. Cahn, a common 
philosophy of education text for the 
undergraduate and graduate students, I 
was surprised that the influence and the 
philosophical imprint of David Hume 
(who awakened Kant) was missing and 
omitted.  David Hume’s ideas were 
monumentally important, not only to 
Immanuel Kant, but also to those who 
would eventually call educational 
behaviorism their home.   
To fill the void, I have included my 
response to the ongoing debates and some 
of the most intriguing questions regarding 
Hume’s philosophical stance, his 
suggestions, and perhaps seeds for those 
who would build on their theories in the 
nineteenth and twentieth century.  
Although David Hume did not write any 
specific chapter on education, his unique 
approach to human learning makes his 
philosophy very valuable today.  His 
insights cannot be ignored, just as we 
cannot ignore Charles Darwin for his 
‘missing’ notes on pedagogy.  What is 
remarkable about Hume’s contribution to 
the philosophy of education is his stance 
on the principles of solid experience as a 
way to perceive reality,  
constructs, or even the constructivist ideas 
for linguistics, missing experience, or 
fallacies.  
David Hume is known for his radical 
system of philosophical empiricism, 
skepticism, and naturalism.  His stance on 
the existence of the innate ideas led him 
to the basic assumption that all human 
knowledge is ultimately founded in 
experience and mainly through causation. 
Some of his most influential publications, 
namely, A treatise of human nature (1739) 
and the consequent  
 
simplification or explanation of this work, 
An enquiry concerning human understanding 
(1748) were misunderstood at first but 
became monumentally constructive for his 
closest follower, Immanuel Kant.  Simply 
put, Hume advocated more for what 
today is known as a psychological basis of 
human nature and experience-based 
learning or experience-based knowledge.  
He argued that reason alone cannot 
possibly be responsible for human 
knowledge, however it is complementary 
and assists inductive reasoning and 
causality.  Hume is regarded as one of the 
most influential philosophers of Western 
philosophy.  The essay below reflects the 
Humean wisdom and his perceptions of 
the observable world, and is intended to 
provoke thoughts, critiques, and 
comparisons to those who conduct 
research in the field of education and 
human wisdom.   
 I shall organize this account around the 
asking of three questions. The first 
question for the discussion provides a 
basic attempt at Hume’s position 
regarding his basic theory of experience-
based causes.  The second question 
ponders his ideas on the Socratic concept 
of akrasia.  The final question deals with 
Hume’s is-ought concept.  Each 
philosophical analysis of a particular 
question is followed by its applicability to 




 Hume offers two definitions of cause, 
as a philosophical relation and as a natural 
relation.   What are we to make of these 
two senses of cause — is Hume a realist, 
anti-realist, subjectivist, or objectivist? 
 Hume describes two causal processes, 
one that occurs in the outside world, and 
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the other in our minds.  To support this, 
Hume provided two definitions of 
causation, which lay at the heart of his 
philosophical foundation, and represented 
a different view of the same object or 
relation.  The association in this relation 
should be understood as either a 
philosophical or natural one.  For clarity 
in this paper, I will simply label the 
definitions as A, and B respectively.  The 
first definition (A) of cause was defined by 
Hume as, “An object precedent and 
contiguous to another, and where all the 
objects resembling the former are placed 
in like relations of precedency and 
contiguity to those objects, that resemble 
the latter” (Norton et al., p. 114).  The 
second definition (B) defined cause as, 
“An object precedent and contiguous to 
another, and so united with it, that the 
idea of the one determines the mind to 
form the idea of the other, and the 
impression of the one to form a more 
lively idea of the other” (Norton et al., p. 
114). 
 I believe that Hume supplied two 
distinctive definitions of an experimental 
method in his own quest to understand 
reality and how that reality was related to 
human learning. He has (A) eliminated, 
and at the same time, (B) introduced 
human bias (or individual perception), by 
which the causation could be observed by 
one definition (A), yet it could not be 
realistically assessed by definition (B), 
partly since our own imagination may 
have created such causation. 
 Hume’s fascination with causation as 
the basic foundation of his philosophy of 
human understanding, perhaps led him to 
draw some basic conclusions: (A) 
causation occurs as it happens in nature 
(observable or not) and (B) causation 
exists as it is observed by the human 
mind. What is perplexing here is the 
notion that (A) could not be observed if 
(B) did not come to being and, therefore, 
causation may not exist at all.  Why was 
Hume dissatisfied with just “one 
definition” of causation?  This is a very 
important interpretive question for at least 
two reasons.  First, I cannot reject him as 
anti-realist by virtue of his first definition 
of cause.  Second, I cannot ignore Hume’s 
claims to the necessity of the second 
definition and all that it represents: a 
central element of his philosophy of 
human learning.  
 Can Hume be truly defined by the 
definitions of what is considered today to 
be a realist, anti-realist, constructivist or 
objectivist?  For the purpose of this short 
paper, I will test the following widely 
understood definitions.  According to 
Stanford’s Philosophical Encyclopedia 
(SPE), a realist, - in a metaphysical sense, is 
“one who wishes to claim that apart from 
the mundane sort of empirical 
dependence of objects and their 
properties familiar to us from everyday 
life, there is no further philosophically 
interesting sense, in which everyday 
objects and their properties can be said to 
be dependent on anyone's linguistic 
practices or conceptual schemes”(SPE).  
By the opposite supposition the anti-realist 
rejects realism. A subjectivist doctrine 
points to “knowledge as merely subjective 
and that there is no external or objective 
truth”(SPE).  Therefore, “Our own 
mental activity is the only unquestionable 
fact of our experience”(SPE).  According 
to the Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (IEP), the term “subjective” 
typically indicates the possibility of error.  
An objectivist, as in reference to objective 
knowledge, may simply refer to 
knowledge of an objective reality by the 
perceiving mind.  Although this 
distinction between the objective and 
subjective reality may create a discrepancy 
as illustrated by Locke’s example of the 
icy and hot water hand experiment.   
 The above (IEP) definitions attempt to 
define Hume’s understanding of how 
human minds perceive causation between 
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ideas; simple or complex, and how 
humans arrive to observe, through 
experience, the causes and effects and vice 
versa.  Hume clearly stated that the first 
definition may identify a relation not 
observable or clearly understood to 
people at the time of observation.  For 
instance, the idea that “bad air”, not 
plasmodium vivax virus, is a cause of 
malaria.  If something causes malaria in 
nature, we see its effect.  Yet over time, and 
through careful and systematic 
experimentation and experience, the true and 
an intuitive cause may be inferred.  For 
example, not “bad air”, but a virus carried 
by the mosquitoes, is the cause of malaria.  
The idea of relation or causation existed 
by Hume’s definition A, yet it was not 
until the process of lived experience brought 
about more assurance and vivacity that 
definition B became suitable.  I believe 
Hume is very consistent in his logic of 
resemblance, contiguity, and ultimately 
causation.  Therefore, his two definitions: 
(A), and (B) were not mutually exclusive.  
 Hume stands by his belief that 
observable causation did not originate in 
reason or a priori knowledge but only in 
experience.  The more experience one has 
regarding the relations between the ideas, 
the more refined the idea of causation 
may have developed.  Therefore, it seems 
that Hume introduced an experimental 
method by way of these two definitions of 
cause, which were based purely on 
repeated experimentation but not reason 
alone.  This means that causation became 
central to Hume’s method of explaining 
human nature.  
 Today the concept of experience-based 
learning (EBL) encompassed Hume’s 
early ideas, and assumes that the 
experience of the learner inhabits the 
center of the learning process (Foley, 
2000).  Reflection upon experience 
becomes the foundation of the learning 
progress and its meaning.  This approach 
also assumes that learning is socially and 
culturally constructed.  Not only it is a 
holistic experience but one that is heavily 
influenced by the individual emotions.  
 Hume seems to reason from factual 
evidence derived from nature, according 
to his two definitions of cause.  He did 
make a clear distinction, in which, even if 
the two objects in causal relation were 
connected to each other, they were still 
distinct and different.  Not only he was a 
realist in the observation of nature (what 
exists is observable) but also an objectivist 
by removing possible erroneous a priori 
conclusions of causation. Hume assumes 
that each observation remains distinct.  
For example, each throw of dice remains 
distinct and not related to the previous.  
Similarly, five contiguous observations do 
not represent a higher spectrum of 
assurance or probability in which all 
further and potential observation will 
remain the same.   
I believe that Hume supplied the two 
distinctive definitions as an experimental 
method in his own quest to understand 
reality and how that reality was related to 
human understanding.  He has, (A) 
eliminated, and at the same time, (B), 
introduced human bias, or individual 
perception, by which causation could be 
observed by definition A, yet it could not 
be realistically assessed by definition B, 
partly since our own imagination may 
have created such causation.  For instance, 
a neatly cut grass in a foreign country may 
suggest to someone who grew up in 
contemporary California, that lawn 
equipment caused it (effect). It may, 
however, be that this effect was produced 
by grazing animals (reality), and not by 
some equipment.  Thus our imagination 
or habit associated the effect with our 
logical conclusion (cause).  The objective 
reality of cause and effect exists in nature 
objectively but may not be known to 
human mind.  The sufficient resembling 
qualities of objects may suffice for 
definition A, yet the demonstrative effect  
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or experience must be supplied by 
definition B - human experience, however 
erroneous or subjective.  
 These two definitions: A, and B, may 
also have suggested the difference, in 
which Hume satisfied the objectiveness of 
things as they appear in nature by way of 
definition A, to a subjective relation of 
objects experienced by an individual 
observer through definition B.  Thus the 
feeling or vivacity produced by our own 
imagination by way of previous 
experiences may suggest a causal 
relationship of a lawn mower to short 
grass, or a grazing goat to short grass by 
way of habits. 
 If the first definition was used by 
Hume to explain objectivity in causal 
relations in nature, then the second 
definition of cause was distinctively 
designed to apply to satisfy the subjective 
processes of human nature.  According to 
Hume, mind conjoins with impressions by 
way of feeling in human imagination of 
the external objects (Norton et al.).  This 
dual approach to causality by Hume was 
clearly consistent with his basic 
foundations and observations (for 
instance, missing shade of blue, whether 
the sun will not rise tomorrow, or his 
basic distinction between relations of 
ideas to matters of fact), and he realized 
the difficulty of his reasoning for an 
average reader.  He clarified in his 
Enquiries, “I know not whether the reader 
will readily apprehend this reasoning.  I 
am afraid that, should I multiply words 
about it, or throw it into a greater variety 
of lights, it would only become more 
obscure and intricate” (Selby-Bigge et al., 
79).  Since the foundation of his reasoning 
regarding “matters of fact” constitutes the 
idea of causation with its foundation in 
“experience” of greater uniformity of 
nature.  For instance, white swans will 
form an experience of “swans” and the 
sun will rise tomorrow as it did always.  
Hume’s method of induction tends to run 
a vicious circle in that we trust the process 
of causation, and trust seems to be the 
foundation of experience, and not perhaps 
a reflection of the uniformity of natural 
experience.  If Hume was a realist by way 
of natural observations, did he ultimately 
give in to the idea of subjective experience 
and human understanding?  I believe that 
he did arrive at the point in which the 
logic of two definitions found itself in a 
vicious circle of contradictions.  His 
theory in which observable reality (nature) 
finds itself in the eye of a beholder 
assumes that an observer exists, and any 
process of causation exists within the 
formulations of human learning. 
 In my opinion, Hume was keenly 
aware of the natural environment and 
man’s place in it.  This fascination perhaps 
led him to draw some basic conclusions: 
(A) causation occurs as it happens in 
nature (observable or not) and (B) 
causation exists as it is learned by the 
human mind. What is perplexing here is 
perhaps the notion that (A) could not be 
observed if (B) did not come to being.  
Therefore, causation may not exist at all.  
This notion was supported by Hume’s 
writing and mentioned as follows, “If true 
causation requires knowable necessary 
connections, it is the required ideas that 
represent impressions of causal powers in 
objects, then there is not true causation at 
all” (Norton et al., p. 162).  Therefore, the 
observation of nature becomes the 
observation of human mind.  This is a 
constructivist base or foundation of 
Hume’s theory of causation.  I assume 
that nature was real to Hume as it 
appeared and did exist only by way of 
human observation. 
 I believe that Hume’s two definitions 
of causes account for every logical and 
realistic possibility in which either nature, 
which is observable, or human mind, 
which expresses feelings, vivacity, or 
experimentation indicate the same idea.  If 
there are in fact three relations between 
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objects, as Hume noted: resemblance, 
contiguity, and cause-effect, then these 
observations relate to nature.  What was 
left, in Hume’s understanding, was the 
philosophical or psychological field of 
causation experienced by human mind?  I 
believe Hume was erroneous on purpose 
by introducing philosophical bias or error 
to his discussion on causality.  He did, 
perhaps, seek answers or discussions from 
the intellectual community to remedy the 
implicit errors of subjectivity of human 
experiences and how the world should be 
observed empirically.  
 These above formulations suggest that 
Hume could be a constructivist, since he 
accounted for human understanding of 
nature, and he safeguarded subjective 
human experiences and habits too, and 
retained them within the second definition 
of cause.  With each example throughout 
the Treatise or Enquiries, Hume suggested 
objective reality, examined the subjective 
reality, and reexamined the imperfections 
for both cases.  
 Lastly, Hume’s definitions of cause 
were the basis for his understanding of 
the human mind. I believe that the notion 
of reality that exists in nature, regardless 
of human perceptions, and the reality 
constructed by the human perception may 
be at odds, even if the object observed 
remained the same. Therefore any 
theories, constructs, or narratives created 
by people in human understanding may as 
well be only perceived as causal relations 
but not necessarily true. For instance, a 
“one-size-fits-all” test approach in 
education, religions, climate cycles, 
science, and so on. 
 John Dewey, in Democracy and Education, 
criticizes most philosophical traditions in 
education, such as those of: Locke, 
Rousseau, Kant, Fichte, and Hegel, 
“especially with regard to their implicit 
reductionism” (Reich et al., 2016, p. 998).  
Dewey rejected an a priori element of 
Locke, Rousseau, and Kant and closely 
followed customary practices and habits 
through which a careful analysis could be 
reconstructed.  Practice and experience 
was the reflection of human learning, 
which mirrors that of Hume.  A 
Skinnerian approach to behaviorism 
assumes that habits and customs are 
conditioned responses to the experienced 
environment.  In fact, these responses 
could be trained as one may train for a 
test.  The problem here is, as pointed out 
by Hume and supported by Dewey, that 
the “objective” qualities of a test become 
too distant to the contextual realities of 
social, cultural, emotional, creative 
dimensions of learning (Reich et al., 2016). 
A typical example of such “objective” 
learning is for example, a “one-size-fits-
all” approach or teaching towards the test.  
The deductive characteristic of this limited 
methodology does not allow for educative 
growth.  It is almost as if one shaved a 
coconut to get to the pre-optioned price, 
as opposed to a process of cultivation of a 
garden with some coconut trees among 
others - not merely for its fruit but also 
for the anticipated excess surplus of other 
fruits, vegetables, and unknown 
possibilities.  These unknown possibilities 
are only assumed through a “one-size-fits-
all” approach, such as the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and 
Development’s (OECD) (PISA) testing.  
Educators assume that standardized 
testing is a good predictor of an inductive 
surplus of students’ success.  Some of 
these philosophical conclusions, I believe, 
identify two important conclusive points: 
1) wrongly interpreted predictive qualities 
of too few observations to explain the 
phenomena, as in a “one-size-fits-all” 
approach, and 2) the experience of an 
individual observation should stand as 
unique to the observable, and any 
theories, constructs, or narratives created 
by people in human understanding may as 
well only be perceived as causal relations 
but not as necessarily true.  After 
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reviewing a Deweyan approach to 
philosophy of education it is remarkable 
how Hume’s 1740s approach to learning 
through experience resonates with 




 Hume declared in 1739 that, "Reason 
is, and ought only to be the slave of the 
passions, and can never pretend to any 
other office than to serve and obey him” 
(p. 174).  How would he answer Socrates's 
claim that no one ever knowingly does 
wrong? 
 In the famous dialogue Protagoras, 
Socrates asserted that, “No one goes 
willingly toward the bad” (p. 124) nor ever 
knowingly does wrong.  As an intellectual 
to whom knowledge was a virtue, and this 
virtue was an integral part of knowledge 
(episteme), Socrates believed that all 
reasonable decisions were based on the 
motivation of gain and benefit to the 
decision maker, however they may seem 
to others.  He argued that even bad 
decisions, as seen by outsiders, originated 
with some calculated benefits, however 
short-lived.  Miscalculation is possible and 
often occurs and could be comparable to 
the miscalculations of the size of objects 
seen from a distance.  In this example, no 
one intends to commit error that may be 
harmful as a consequence, but at the same 
time, no one possesses the correct 
knowledge to make a totally error-free 
decision.  This skill could be learned or 
taught, Socrates argues, and thus logically 
explains that virtue and knowledge could 
be acquired, therefore, the harmful effects 
could be remedied by knowledge and 
education.  
 Unlike Socrates, Hume argues, “that 
reason alone can never be a motive to any 
action of the will; and that it can never 
oppose passion in the direction of the 
will” (Norton et al., p.260).  This stance is 
very anti-intellectual and a counterpoint to 
the virtue of reason argued by Socrates.  
Hume delegates reason as doubtful, blind, 
inconstant, and deceitful to passions 
defined as “the internal impressions we 
feel and are conscious of, when we 
knowingly give rise to any new motion of 
our body or new perception of our mind” 
(Norton et al., p. 266).  In addition, virtues 
as the basis for informed and correct 
decisions argued by Socrates, are rejected 
by Hume, who states that even, 
“demonstrative reasoning (math) never 
influences our actions, but only directs 
our judgement concerning causes and 
effects; which leads us to the second 
operation of the understanding” - 
prospects of pain and pleasure (p. 267).  
Hume believes that reason’s role is simply 
that of assistance and not the originator in 
decision-making, and, “This is from the 
prospect of pain or pleasure that the 
aversion or propensity arises towards any 
object” (p. 267) through processes of 
cause and effect and experience.  Since 
reason only assists with the connections 
required for causal affects, reason alone 
can never produce or prevent any action 
that is formed primarily by impulse of 
passion.  As a consequence, Hume 
proclaims that, “Reason is and ought only 
to be the slave of the passions, and can 
never pretend to any other office than to 
serve and obey them” (p. 268). 
 One of the greatest differences 
between the Socratic and Humean 
approach is the role of reason, virtue, and 
knowledge in the process of influencing 
motives of the will.  What sets them both 
apart is the fundamental approach, in 
ancient and modern philosophy, to the 
combat between passion and reason.  
Socrates argues for reason and knowledge 
in decision-making, while Hume for 
passions by way of subservient reason’s 
assistance.  Hume uses reason as an 
instrument to figure out causation, which 
is the foundation of Hume’s human 
understanding.  Practically speaking of 
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Hume, human reason only enables the 
necessary connections needed for 
behavioral mechanisms or learning. At the 
same time, reason is part of the 
practicality of the process in which some 
decisions may be deemed by reason as 
unreasonable. Therefore, causation or 
experiences may be re-examined by this 
reasonable process.  This perhaps could 
be learned but mostly experienced to ease 
or to facilitate the causation process.  I 
believe that Hume’s theory of behavior 
motivation or action as he defined it lies in 
his basic mechanical foundations.  By this, 
I mean the very behavioral-like conditions 
of the mechanisms of how humans 
understand and behave, such as; 
causation, experience, motivation toward 
pleasure, and aversion from pain.  His 
approach deems reason partly needed to 
sort out the unknowns or uncorrelated 
from the greater mill of causation.  
Hume’s approach reminds me of a blank 
canvas of human mind or a computer 
without software, which only becomes 
something after some initially injected or 
experienced new data in order to make 
sense of undoubtedly chaotic streams of 
foreign and unrelated information.  Since 
Hume rejects a priori construction of 
human mind, this approach leaves him no 
room to consider human reason in 
broader terms.  Socrates, on the other 
hand, attempts to build a cognitive world 
with human reason as virtue (knowledge) 
at its center.  He does not have to reject 
reason as secondary to human passion, 
since his theory is not based in the 
mechanical concepts of ideas, 
impressions, connections, or causality.  
The Socratic approach to lived experience 
is purely complementary to its influences 
on the cognitive abilities of human mind.  
It is reason and knowledge to which 
experience is complementary and often 
necessary.  If lived experience is missing, 
which it may be, the equivalent value may 
be learned.  
 Hume rejects the assertion that 
morality is born from reason or that it is a 
product of reason alone.  He continues 
that vice and immorality are not found in 
causes and effects but only in the 
sentiments of the observers.  His 
discussions on demonstrative reasoning 
described the relations of ideas but not 
virtues or vices, which are not part of the 
process of resemblance, contiguity, or 
cause and effect.  His anti-rationalist 
approach is best illustrated by his 
representation of argument in which 
passions, volition, and actions can be 
neither reasonable nor unreasonable.  
Since reason cannot provide action, 
morality then must be somehow 
connected to passions that generate 
actions.  This is a very important assertion 
by Hume who disconnects reason from 
morality.  Hume agrees that people will 
commit to some obligations by way of the 
simple mechanism that assumes a certain 
degree of reward (pleasure) or pain if 
action is not taken or taken to a certain 
expectation.  He rejects Hobbesian 
societal obligation or action of some sort 
of intuitive thinking bound by the social 
covenant but agrees that some could do it 
to satisfy their appetites of passion or self-
interest.  This is not to say that Socrates 
and Hume are in concert here.  Socrates 
confronts the idea of innate wrongdoing 
by human mind, and argues that such is 
purely done out of ignorance of facts.  
Hume, on the other hand, rejects the 
general consensus that people may be do-
gooders by reason alone, and introduces 
self-interest as if in a contractual 
relationship that posits trust and 
predictability that could be rewarded or 
punished through pain and pleasure. In 
fact, I believe that Hume follows closely 
Newtonian principles by way of finding 
causes for everything that happens 
concerning human mind.  Hume does not 
treat virtues as some sort of a priori 
instinct or understanding delivered and 
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implanted by God, and he explains them 
as a psychologist in need of finding cause 
to an effect. 
 Hume could certainly respond to 
Socrates that human emotions are 
contiguous and depend on signs of a 
sentiment sent from one to another 
(Norton et al., p. 238).  In such a way, we 
do feel sentiments, not goodness 
described by Socrates.  Since Hume 
defines sympathy as the propensity to act, 
all communication and clues from the 
outside world are just indications from 
others.  Therefore, decisions and will 
bring action from passions based on the 
sentiments received.  Reason, only sorts 
out the irregularities resulting from the 
differences between our sentiments and 
those exhibited or experienced by others.  
Simply, Humean process is very 
mechanical, it excludes a priori morality 
that Socrates believed was heavily vested 
in human behavior, and strictly depends 
on sentiments, or impressions’ clues from 
others.  If others are immoral and act out 
of viciousness, Humean process would 
copy this behavior, however 
contradictory, and provide action similar 
to that observed.  Hume states that the 
greater concept of morality does not exist.  
We are merely copying each other.  After 
reading Treatise I and II, what I believe is 
a difference, between Hume’s and 
Socrates’ positions on the fundamentals of 
human will, is to do with the mechanics of 
behavioral and cognitive process.  To 
Hume, reason is secondary to passions, 
while to Socrates reason and virtue are the 
catalysts for everything that follows.  I 
assert that Hume expects all human 
beings to resemble each other in all 
functions of life, including that of reason, 
therefore, the impressions of ideas shared 
between humans and the vivacity and 
feeling they produce vary in individuals 
based on their sentiments.  This 
contradicts Socrates on the basis of an a 
priori concept of goodness and morality, 
and it is doubtful that Socrates could 
accept such mechanics in the human will.  
What guides Socratic concepts in which 
“no one knowingly does anything wrong” 
is a greater argument of self-betterment.  
In Humean philosophy this a priori 
concept of ubiquity of morality is replaced 
by the mechanics of copied impressions, 
which, in turn, are agreed by the society as 
acceptable, since morality, as it is known 
to Socrates, does not exist in Hume.  The 
dichotomy of the battle between reason 
and passions does not exist in Hume’s 
writing, and no amount of learning or 
knowledge will change that, instead, the 
idea of the liveliness (vivacity) of the 
impressions create a sentiment that is 
morally neutral, a dramatic change to that 
of Socratic thinking.  Lastly, I believe, that 
similarly to Socrates, Hume asserts that 
human understanding or will is subject to 
the concept of the prevalence of self-
interest in Socratic understanding, and the 
pleasure principle in Hume’s writing. 
Therefore, the greater morality is created 
by copying the impressions from people 
around, which become lived experiences 
in Humean understanding, therefore 
morally accepted as normative.  In such 
way, virtue is created by the copying 
mechanism, impressions, resemblance, 
cause and effect, and greater reward of 
pleasure or penalty of pain, but not reason 
alone.  I think Hume would reject the 
Socratic concept of a priori morality and 
goodness as if implanted by God or 
nature, and he would defend the 
Newtonian mechanism of causality in 
nature as the only way to derive truths 
about human understanding.  
 The teaching of ethics underlines 
exactly this idea, where an a priori concept 
of ethics is absent among students, and a 
new normative morality is built by 
experience, and more like a social policy.  
In this process, a student assumes that 
ethical behavior is an institutional policy 
that may or may not be applicable outside 
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of the classroom’s frameworks.  I believe, 
that students’ ethical behavior varies 
depending on the level of experience, 
institutional proximity, and social 
adaptability of learned ethics. 
 The implications of Humean Akratic 
approach to the field of education could 
suggest that cheating, for example, may 
not be immoral or set within individual 
boundaries of morality but as a product of 
practice or a construct.  For instance, new 
exposure to newly introduced “morality 
boundaries,” where cheating is not 
allowed, creates new sets of parameters of 
morality to which an individual will adjust.  
The initial punishment for “cheating” 
becomes immoral as a contradiction to 
the prior experience, assuming cheating 
was prevalent and somehow acceptable in 
the past, and any consequence of past 
cheating in the newly constructed morality 
of “no cheating” cannot be held against 
the individual where it becomes itself 
illogical.  After all, Hume insisted that, just 
because we have experienced five 
consecutive occurrences of white swans, it 
does not mean that the next swan to be 
seen will in fact be guaranteed to be white.  
This logic if applied to cheating instances 
or investigations among students assumes 
illogical assumptions that past experience 
will inference the future.  It is easier to 
assume that cheating “morality” is socially 
constructed, and has nothing to do with 
an innate human sense of morality, at least 
in Humean meaning. According to 
Strom’s (2008) study quoting Sommers 
and Satel (2005), “Dishonesty in school is 
merely a reflection of the broader erosion 
of ethical behavior which has become 
commonplace in societies that tend to 
support self-centeredness over concern 
for others” (p. 107).  Another observation 
in the same study suggests that, “Teachers 
are partially responsible because they 
ignore evidence of character failure and 
choose not to hold students accountable” 
(p. 107).  In light of Strom's study, the 
established experience of felt lack of 
responsibility and accountability by the 
students reinforces the motivation to 
cheat as a socially “constructed” clue from 
the environment.  An approach of 
originality through which a meaningful 
new project or essay on the information 
gathered by the writer in the form of 
observations, interviews, or experiments 
could generate a new “constructed” norm.  
Therefore, a whole set of newly 
“constructed” assignments based on a 
new set of guidelines could reset the 
expectation of the norm.  Using oral 
critique, reflectivity, an ongoing revision 
process of improving the final product of 
a project, including its public presentation 
could break the cycle of plagiarism.  This 
is to say that the entire nature of the 
assignments should reflect the new 




 What is Hume claiming in the famous 
is-ought passage of Book III, Part 1, 
Section I? Is he claiming that you cannot 
get an ought from an is (R. M. Hare calls 
this "Hume's Law") or is he claiming 
something altogether different, even 
contrary to this? How does his position 
relate to the statistical sampling debate in 
the field of education? 
 The famous passage representing the 
last paragraph of Book III, Part I, Section 
I, of Hume’s Treatise has been analyzed 
and discussed by many who either find 
the Humean approach to human morality 
contradictory or completely consistent 
with [Hume’s] “notions on the 
imperfections and narrow limits of human 
understanding”(p. 301).  In this short 
analysis, I argue that Hume attempts to 
discredit the doctrines and the dogmas of 
orthodox religious beliefs.  What Hume 
says is: 
In every system of morality, which I 
have hitherto met with, I have always 
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remarked, that the author proceeds 
for some time in the ordinary way of 
reasoning, and establishes the being of 
a God, or makes observations 
concerning human affairs; when of a 
sudden I am surprised to find, that 
instead of the usual copulations of 
propositions, is, and is not, I meet with 
no proposition that is not connected 
with an ought, or an ought not. This 
change is imperceptible; but is, 
however, of the last consequence. For 
as this ought, or ought not, expresses 
some new relation or affirmation, this 
necessary that it should be observed 
and explained; and at the same time 
that a reason should be given, for 
what seems altogether inconceivable, 
how this new relation can be a 
deduction from others, which are 
entirely different from it … I shall 
presume to recommend it to the 
reader; and am persuaded, that this 
small attention would subvert all the 
vulgar systems of morality, and let us 
see, that the distinction of vice and 
virtue is not founded merely on the 
relations of objects, nor is perceived 
by reason. (p. 302) 
 A typical interpretation of this passage 
is that morals come from the matters of fact 
and any immoral act, such as a murder, is 
reasoned to be wrong.  One can also infer 
that morals are not part of the matters of 
fact, and morality is simply arbitrary and 
found in the relations of ideas.  Although 
this may sound utterly confusing and 
contradictory to most readers of Hume, I 
believe that Hume pragmatically delivers 
his skepticism towards the narrowness of 
human or societal “systems” of 
understanding.  Hume attempts to 
demonstrate that the only principles or 
“systems” available to people are 
discovered by his non-codified principles 
of association: resemblance, contiguity, 
and causality.  Most codified principles 
with which Hume did not agree are too 
limiting for human free understanding and 
include among others: religious ethics’ 
“Ten Commandments,” the dualities or 
dichotomy of arguments from Descartes, 
and even Newtonian principles.  Hume 
argues that the deductive qualities of the 
scientific method are too rigid, and bound 
already by an arbitrary limit, therefore 
unfree and not open enough to 
experiment.  The skeptical approach to 
the scientific method, in Hume’s 
estimation, delivers unbounded 
possibilities, including the basic 
understanding of morality and perhaps - 
God.  I believe, Hume hints at the 
possibility that the only reality that exists 
is one that is perceived by our senses, 
experiences, and causation.  For instance, 
take for example saying that God exists 
equals a statement of fact or self-
explanatory demonstration that the 
existence is true.  Hume cannot 
demonstratively prove that God exists 
(for instance, 2+2=4) but he insists, likely 
because of his critics, that the complex 
world that exists is a demonstrative fact 
on its own, fully observable and 
experienced in reality, therefore created by 
supreme intelligence or intellect, and most 
likely God.  Hume’s calibration of this 
statement could be interpreted by the 
following: if God is believed to exist, and 
all signs point to intelligent design (reality 
of the world), therefore God ought to exist 
by habitual belief (religion) or the 
experience of the world.  If experience is 
the only way to understand, and a concept 
of God may be experienced by habit, it is 
only natural for our senses to experience 
God.  This does not demonstrate God’s 
existence by Hume’s method, instead, we 
only know particular impressions, beliefs, 
and causations of the idea of God or 
religion.  In a similar way, a missing shade 
of color may be reproduced or even 
experienced by an individual by way of 
resemblance or habit, even if such shade 
of color does not exist.  I believe that 
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Hume fully demonstrated his point here 
on (non)existence of God. 
 I make sense of Hume’s position on 
morality from the perspective in which 
the moral code (virtues and vices) ought or 
is are bound within the matters of fact.  Only 
experience, and not a priori knowledge can 
determine the understanding by way of 
habit and causality.  This skeptical 
approach builds up understanding by not 
deducing from the established principles 
(for example, Catholic ethics) but by 
forming from bottom up vis a vis the 
Humean trivium (resemblance, contiguity, 
causality). Hume argues that we cannot 
prove the universal a priori morality, and 
he implies that only experience, or its lack, 
makes our own perception of belief.  
There is no set standard of morality 
among rational beings, thus a savage 
behavior elsewhere may be just as 
normative as attending church services in 
Scotland.  The morality, as Hume sees it, 
is as fluid as the breadth of our experience 
with or without it.  For instance, most 
would agree to call a patricidal murder an 
immoral act, but not many could see a 
parity of that act to a patricide between an 
oak tree and its sapling.  
 What I find contradictory is Hume’s 
Enquiry position on belief in a divine judge 
and its sanctioned effects on morality 
(Selby-Bigge, 1996, p. 147).  In Enquiry, 
Hume states that having the idea of the 
final judgment [religiously speaking] 
creates the impression of necessity, pain 
or pleasure, and certain fulfilling moral 
conduct.  This naturally does not prove 
that God is and exists, but it insinuates 
posterior belief that God ought to exist (a 
contradiction).  
 I believe that Hume, through his 
systematic skeptical critique, attempts to 
discredit the doctrines and dogmas of 
orthodox religious belief.  He cannot do it 
openly by proclaiming that God is dead, 
but he does it through a kitchen door - his 
lack of piety and clever attacks on theism.  
For Hume, morality is a fully practical and 
experience-based affair that sanctions, 
conforms, or motivates behavior.  In my 
opinion, this mechanical approach to 
morality creates an idea of program-like 
behavior, and generates a notion of a 
passive mind that only reacts to 
perceptions and impressions.  Hume 
modifies Locke’s idea of “tabula rasa,” 
and Berkeley’s conclusion of “to be is to 
be perceived,” and formulates a skeptical 
platform in which “no ideas are innate”.  
This assertion is monumental for Hume, 
and a foundation for behaviorism in the 
field of education.  Therefore, all learning 
is experience-based. Human learning, for 
Hume, exists in a loop of exposure, 
experience, and habit.  Although Hume 
did not write on education in particular, 
he did describe a Skinnerian theory of 
learning.  It has no a priori construct, 
therefore, all that is known is simply 
reproduced, learned, and generated based 
on the senses and causal relations.  A 
person can have an idea of an apple or a 
tree, but human understanding can also 
erroneously imagine (relate) a mermaid or 
a unicorn, that become habitually real yet 
do not exist.  Hume presents a valid 
logical argument in which the existence of 
God could be comparable to that of the 
existence of a mermaid or a unicorn, and 
the only skeptical methodology to find the 
truth is the experience alone.  
 If Hume himself commits inferences 
from is to ought on several occasions and 
at the same time suggests that an ought 
cannot be derived from an is, could the 
key to decipher what Hume really meant 
be based on the argumentation and its 
moral or ethical acuteness?  When 
combined with Hume’s fork, the ought-is 
designation creates a problem in which 
there is a possibility of no moral 
knowledge.  Morality is not self-
demonstrative as it is not universal, but a 
morality could be experienced, yet 
questioned based on the individual 
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experience.  If such possibility exists 
according to Hume, the is-ought statement 
creates a contradiction that threatens the 
validity of morality or ethics by implying 
subjective and arbitrary judgments.  The 
logic of this argument rejects the 
argumentation of ethics as the key to this 
riddle. 
 The pragmatism of Hume seeing the 
idea about the idea, lies in the fact that 
ideas are not there to be discovered but to 
be used as tools of experience in order to 
understand the world.  Collectively, ideas 
become social tools and entirely 
dependent upon people and their 
environment of which morality, ethics, or 
religion becomes a human creation.  Since 
all ideas, according to Hume, are based on 
the real-world experience, a new reality of 
today’s social media tools, such as, 
gathered information on trends, fashion, 
art, and meta-data “re-create” the 
perceived world.  By eliminating objective 
knowledge, Hume attacks the permeated 
“objectivity” as the basis for traditional 
philosophical and scientific discourse and 
introduces a new creative approach.  The 
experience-based approach, and not the 
universally held norms, are, according to 
Hume, the truest reflections of reality 
(human and nature centered but not 
superstitious or religious).    
 Overall, Hume is remarkably 
pragmatic, he relies on coherent accounts 
of human experience, he excludes the 
possibilities of erroneous turns, such as; 
the superstitions or unfounded 
connections “oughts from is,” and builds 
from ground up a new experimental 
method of human understanding that is 
based solely on the mechanical premise of 
the perceptions and human experiences to 
include his position on religion.  The 
experience-based approach to education, 
in the postmodern sense of 
understanding, drives and exposes human-
centered accounts of human experience, 
which may not be universal, and applies 
them to the greater understanding and 
developing of our educational curriculum.  
We teach and test ourselves to avoid is to 
ought errors through evidence-based 
research.  While we rely on the statistical 
inferences of the future or sampled 
observations,  our limited approach relies 
heavily on the Humean ought to, rather 
than is.  By analyzing this third question, I 
cannot help but to stress the importance 
of a qualitative approach to educational 
research, where a single observation or a 
piece of evidence is analyzed for the 
qualities that are observable without 
committing the inferential “ought” of 
probabilities that tend to fit or diminish 
the “is”.  The “affinity of researchers” 
with certain kinds of people, designs, data, 
theories, concepts, or explanations 
(Norris, 1997) introduce biases, which are 
embedded in the exact process described 
by Hume.  Consequently some biases, 
including “the sampling of times, places, 
events, people, issues, questions and the 
balance between the dramatic and the 
mundane,” find their way into research as 
unavoidable and reflective of is to ought 
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